On May 23, 2018, in XY, LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics, L.C., CAFC held that its affirmance of PTAB’s invalidity decision regarding certain claims of a patent owned by XY in a separate appeal involving a different defendant must be given “immediate issue preclusive effect” with respect to the same claims in the present

On October 4, 2017, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, overruled an earlier panel decision and found that the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) had been impermissibly placing the burden of proving the patentability of amended claims on the Patent Owner, rather than the Petitioner.   See, Aqua Products

The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals again vacated a Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) panel decision for failing to properly evaluate “objective evidence of non-obviousness” and remanded the case for determinations consistent with its opinion. Specifically, the Fed. Cir. panel faulted the PTAB’s analysis Patent Owner’s objective evidence of unexpected results and further found

In the case of Phygenix, Inc. v. ImmunoGen, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) held that the petitioner (Phygenix) that had unsuccessfully challenged certain claims of ImmunoGen’s U.S. Patent No. 8,337,856 (“the ‘856 patent”) in an inter partes review (IPR) lacked standing to appeal a Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) decision that affirmed the validity of the challenged claims because Phigenix had “not offered sufficient proof establishing that it has suffered an injury in fact…”  Although the Federal Circuit has required appellants to demonstrate standing in other proceedings, the Phygenix case is the first time this doctrine has been applied to bar an appeal of a final written decision in an IPR proceeding.

ImmunoGen owns the ‘856 patent, which is directed to an antibody-maytansinoid conjugate that is purportedly useful in combating a variety of cancers. Genentech has a worldwide exclusive license to the ‘856 patent for producing the drug Kadcyla®. Phigenix in turn owns U.S. Patent No. 8,080,534 (“the ‘534 patent”). Phigenix alleged that the ‘534 patent covers Genentech’s activities relating to Kadcyla and hence the subject matter claimed in the ‘856 patent.

The America Invents Act (AIA) provides that “a person who is not the owner of a patent may file with the Office a petition to institute an inter partes review of the patent.” 35 U.S.C. 311(a). The AIA does not impose a standing requirement for a challenger to request the institution of an inter partes review (IPR) of a patent.  However, the patent appellate court recently held that an IPR petitioner must have standing in order seek the appellate review of a PTAB’s final decision.

Phigenix sought inter partes review of the claims of the ‘856 patent based on an obviousness challenge.  The PTAB initiated a trial but ultimately found the challenged claims to be nonobvious.  Following the final written decision, Phigenix appealed the PTAB’s decision to the CAFC.  In response, ImmunoGen filed a motion to dismiss arguing that Phigenix lacked standing to appeal the PTAB’s decision.  A single judge of the CAFC denied ImmunoGen’s motion but requested that the parties file briefs addressing the standing issue. 

Phigenix provided declarations in support of its standing to appeal the PTAB’s decision and argued that ImmunoGen’s ‘856 patent increases competition between itself and ImmunoGen and increased competition represents a cognizable injury.  In particular, Phigenix argued that “[t]he existence of ImmunoGen’s ‘856 patent has … encumber[ed] Phigenix’s licensing efforts while ImmunoGen receives millions of dollars in licensing revenue.” Phigenix did not, however, contend that it faced the risk of infringing the ‘856 patent, or that it was an actual or prospective licensee of the ‘856 patent, or that it planned to take any action that would implicate the ‘856 patent.

The CAFC emphasized that a party’s standing to sue is a doctrine that is rooted in the case or controversy requirement of Article III of the U.S. constitution. In particular, in order to have standing, an appellant “must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the [appellee], (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”  Further, the CAFC stressed that although Article III standing is not necessarily a requirement to appear before an administrative agency, “an appellant must nonetheless supply the requisite proof of an injury in fact when it seeks review of an agency’s final action in a federal court.” 
Continue Reading Federal Circuit Requires Standing To Appeal An IPR Decision

The Federal Circuit reversed a Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) invalidity decision last week that had found a patent for a molasses-based, road deicing agent obvious over earlier patents on sugar-related inventions.  The Federal Circuit panel of Judges Pauline Newman, Raymond C. Clevenger and Kathleen M. O’Malley concluded that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) finding of invalidity during reexamination proceedings was faulty because the USPTO had failed to set forth a prima facie case explaining why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine references from disparate technological fields.  In Re Natural Alternatives, LLC (Fed. Cir. No. 2015-1911, August 31, 2016).

Univar, Inc., a licensee of U.S. Patent No. 6,080,330 owned by Natural Alternatives, LLC., filed three reexamination requests in 2011, seeking review of the licensed patent. The reexamination proceedings were consolidated, and the examiner found the claims drawn to a deicing composition comprising 25-99% desugared sugar beet molasses obvious in light of an earlier Polish patent combined with certain secondary prior art references.  Natural Alternatives appealed the reexamination decision to the PTAB but the board affirmed the examiner’s position, and the patent owner then appealed to the Court of  Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

In a decision handed down on August 31, 2016, the Federal Circuit disagreed with the PTAB’s reasoning.  First, the panel found the PTAB’s reliance on a 1990 Polish Patent No. PL 164018 to Zdzislaw (“Zdzislaw”) was misplaced because it did not teach the use of “desugared” molasses.  The process described in the Polish patent retained approximately 50% of the sugar in the molasses, while the patent at issue described processes for removal of most of the sugar.  Second, the Federal Circuit panel found one of the secondary references to be so far afield of the invention that a skilled artisan would not have motivated to combine it with Zdzislaw.  Finally, the panel found the examiner and the PTAB had improperly ignored the patent owner’s evidence of commercial success.

In particular, the decision criticized the PTAB’s reliance on U.S. Patent No. 5,639,319 to Daly (“Daly”); alone or together with a journal article titled “Winter is Hell,” published July 1997 in Public Works (“Public Works”).  The Daly patent was directed to the use of desugared sugar beet molasses (DSBM) as tire ballast, which served the unrelated purpose of stabilizing and balancing tires.  The Federal Circuit panel agreed with the patent owner that a person having ordinary skill in the art would not have found Daly to be reasonably pertinent to the problem of deicing road surfaces.
Continue Reading Despite PTAB “Sweet Talk” Federal Circuit Reverses Invalidity Of Deicing Patent

The Cuozzo v. Garmin case, discussed in our blog in January, has been decided in favor of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). A divided panel decided 2-1 to uphold the USPTO’s claim construction standard used by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) in the new inter partes review proceedings under the America Invents Act (AIA). See, In re: Cuozzo Speed Technologies LLC, CAFC Case Number 2014-1301, Opinion dated February 4, 2015.

The majority decision, written by Judge Timothy Dyk, concludes that Congress authorized the “broadest reasonable interpretation” (BRI) standard for inter partes review (IPR), post-grant review (PGR) and covered business method (CBM) proceedings, even if the statute did not define what claim construction standard should be used.

The majority opinion, in which Judge Raymond Clevenger joined Judge Dyks, found that the adoption of the BRI standard did not exceed the USPTO’s authority. “There is no indication that the AIA was designed to change the claim construction standard that the USPTO has applied for more than 100 years,” according Judges Dyks and Clevenger.

As the name suggests, the BRI rule gives the PTAB the ability to interpret each element of a claim as broadly as reasonably possible so long as the interpretation is not contradicted by the patent specification. The impact of such broad interpretations is that claim language can “read on” prior art that otherwise might not be relevant if the claim element is given its ordinary meaning.
Continue Reading Federal Circuit Panel Blesses BRI Standard for Claim Construction at PTAB But Another Panel May Not

According to its mission statement, Consumer Watchdog is a non-profit entity “dedicated to providing an effective voice for taxpayers and consumers in an era when special interests dominate public discourse, government and politics” – and they apparently also challenge patents in their spare time.

In 2006 Consumer Watchdog filed a request for inter partes reexamination under the old pre-AIA rules, challenging certain patent rights to stem cells that had been granted by the USPTO to the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation. When this public interest group failed to get the WARF patent thrown out last year, they exercised their statutory right to appeal. Section 141(c) of the U.S. Patent Laws provides that a party to a USPTO administrative proceeding who is dissatisfied with the Patent Office’s final written decision may appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. (35 U.S.C. § 141.)

However, like Dikembe Mutombo swatting away a lay-up, the Federal Circuit recently told Consumer Watchdog: Not in my house! Chief Judge Radar writing for a unanimous three-judge panel rejected the appeal out of hand because the public interest appellant simply lacked standing. According to the Federal Circuit opinion, to invoke federal jurisdiction, the petitioner must meet the minimum requirements of Article III. Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Continue Reading Do-Gooders Need Not Apply