IPR petitioners wary of the statutory estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) may have reason to be cautiously optimistic.   Judge Sue Robinson of the Federal District Court of Delaware recently held that Toshiba is not estopped from presenting invalidity grounds at trial that it did not raise in an earlier IPR.  Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Toshiba Corp. No. 1:13-cv-00453, D.I. 559 & 574 (D. Del. December 19, 2016 & January 11, 2017).

35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) reads in relevant part:

The petitioner in an inter partes review of a claim in a patent under this chapter that results in a final written decision under section 318(a) . . . may not assert . . . in a civil action arising in whole or in part under section 1338 of title 28 . . . that the claim is invalid on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review.

In her opinion, Judge Robison noted that the Federal Circuit has interpreted Section 315(e)(2) very literally. “[E]stoppel applies to grounds for invalidity upon which the Board instated review in the IPR proceeding, whether or not the Board addresses those grounds in its final decision (‘instituted grounds’). . . . [T]here likewise can be no dispute that estoppel does not apply to invalidity grounds that were raised by a petitioner in an IPR, but rejected by the Board as instituted grounds (i.e., ‘noninstituted grounds’).” Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Toshiba Corp. No. 1:13-cv-00453, D.I. 574 (D. Del. January 11, 2017).

As background, Intellectual Ventures sued Toshiba for infringement of claims 17 and 19 of the ’819 Patent in Delaware in 2013. Toshiba petitioned for IPR of the ’819 Patent in 2014. Toshiba prevailed in the IPR, with the PTAB invalidating claims 17 and 19 in a final written decision. Toshiba Corp. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, No. IPR2014-00418, Paper No. 28 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 7, 2015).

Before the Delaware court, Intellectual Ventures moved for summary judgment that Toshiba is estopped from raising one of its invalidity grounds at trial because the ground was based on publicly available prior art that could have been raised in Toshiba’s IPR petition. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Toshiba Corp., No. 1:13-cv-00453, D.I. 559 at p.26 (D. Del. December 19, 2016). Judge Robinson disagreed, citing Shaw Indus. Group, Inc. v. Automated Creel Systems. Id. In Shaw, the Federal Circuit held that Section 315(e)(2) does not estop a ground rejected by the PTAB at the institution stage because, since “[t]he IPR does not begin until it is instituted,” the petitioner “could [not] have reasonably raised – the [rejected] ground during the IPR.” 817 F.3d 1293, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original). Extending the Shaw logic, Judge Robinson found that Toshiba is not estopped from raising its invalidity ground that was not raised at all in IPR. No. 1:13-cv-00453, D.I. 559 at 27 (D. Del. December 19, 2016). But Judge Robinson expressed misgivings at this result, noting that “[a]lthough extending the [Shaw] logic to prior art references that were never presented to the PTAB at all (despite their public nature) confounds the very purpose of this parallel administrative proceeding, the court cannot divine a reasoned way around the Federal Circuit’s interpretation in Shaw.” Id.
Continue Reading IPR Estoppel Provisions May Not Be That Scary After All

In the case of Phygenix, Inc. v. ImmunoGen, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) held that the petitioner (Phygenix) that had unsuccessfully challenged certain claims of ImmunoGen’s U.S. Patent No. 8,337,856 (“the ‘856 patent”) in an inter partes review (IPR) lacked standing to appeal a Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) decision that affirmed the validity of the challenged claims because Phigenix had “not offered sufficient proof establishing that it has suffered an injury in fact…”  Although the Federal Circuit has required appellants to demonstrate standing in other proceedings, the Phygenix case is the first time this doctrine has been applied to bar an appeal of a final written decision in an IPR proceeding.

ImmunoGen owns the ‘856 patent, which is directed to an antibody-maytansinoid conjugate that is purportedly useful in combating a variety of cancers. Genentech has a worldwide exclusive license to the ‘856 patent for producing the drug Kadcyla®. Phigenix in turn owns U.S. Patent No. 8,080,534 (“the ‘534 patent”). Phigenix alleged that the ‘534 patent covers Genentech’s activities relating to Kadcyla and hence the subject matter claimed in the ‘856 patent.

The America Invents Act (AIA) provides that “a person who is not the owner of a patent may file with the Office a petition to institute an inter partes review of the patent.” 35 U.S.C. 311(a). The AIA does not impose a standing requirement for a challenger to request the institution of an inter partes review (IPR) of a patent.  However, the patent appellate court recently held that an IPR petitioner must have standing in order seek the appellate review of a PTAB’s final decision.

Phigenix sought inter partes review of the claims of the ‘856 patent based on an obviousness challenge.  The PTAB initiated a trial but ultimately found the challenged claims to be nonobvious.  Following the final written decision, Phigenix appealed the PTAB’s decision to the CAFC.  In response, ImmunoGen filed a motion to dismiss arguing that Phigenix lacked standing to appeal the PTAB’s decision.  A single judge of the CAFC denied ImmunoGen’s motion but requested that the parties file briefs addressing the standing issue. 

Phigenix provided declarations in support of its standing to appeal the PTAB’s decision and argued that ImmunoGen’s ‘856 patent increases competition between itself and ImmunoGen and increased competition represents a cognizable injury.  In particular, Phigenix argued that “[t]he existence of ImmunoGen’s ‘856 patent has … encumber[ed] Phigenix’s licensing efforts while ImmunoGen receives millions of dollars in licensing revenue.” Phigenix did not, however, contend that it faced the risk of infringing the ‘856 patent, or that it was an actual or prospective licensee of the ‘856 patent, or that it planned to take any action that would implicate the ‘856 patent.

The CAFC emphasized that a party’s standing to sue is a doctrine that is rooted in the case or controversy requirement of Article III of the U.S. constitution. In particular, in order to have standing, an appellant “must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the [appellee], (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”  Further, the CAFC stressed that although Article III standing is not necessarily a requirement to appear before an administrative agency, “an appellant must nonetheless supply the requisite proof of an injury in fact when it seeks review of an agency’s final action in a federal court.” 
Continue Reading Federal Circuit Requires Standing To Appeal An IPR Decision

According to its mission statement, Consumer Watchdog is a non-profit entity “dedicated to providing an effective voice for taxpayers and consumers in an era when special interests dominate public discourse, government and politics” – and they apparently also challenge patents in their spare time.

In 2006 Consumer Watchdog filed a request for inter partes reexamination under the old pre-AIA rules, challenging certain patent rights to stem cells that had been granted by the USPTO to the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation. When this public interest group failed to get the WARF patent thrown out last year, they exercised their statutory right to appeal. Section 141(c) of the U.S. Patent Laws provides that a party to a USPTO administrative proceeding who is dissatisfied with the Patent Office’s final written decision may appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. (35 U.S.C. § 141.)

However, like Dikembe Mutombo swatting away a lay-up, the Federal Circuit recently told Consumer Watchdog: Not in my house! Chief Judge Radar writing for a unanimous three-judge panel rejected the appeal out of hand because the public interest appellant simply lacked standing. According to the Federal Circuit opinion, to invoke federal jurisdiction, the petitioner must meet the minimum requirements of Article III. Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Continue Reading Do-Gooders Need Not Apply

As we had reported earlier, a patent owner has a heavy burden in amending claims in an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding.  The recent case of Nichia Corp. v. Emcore Corp. (IPR2012-00005) provides an example of obstacles that a patent owner may face when attempting to amend the challenged claims.  In this case, the patent owner (Emcore) filed a motion with the PTAB to request leave to cancel certain challenged claims and replace them with new claims.  The PTAB denied Emcore’s motion to amend.
Continue Reading The PTAB’s Denial of Patent Owner’s Motion to Amend Underscores the Obstacles that Patent Owners Face In Amending Challenged Claims

James Donald Smith, the Chief Administrative Patent Judge of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) was the keynote speaker at the Boston Patent Law Association (BPLA) Annual Meeting on December 11, 2013 and gave a comprehensive, albeit somewhat tongue-in-check, report on the state of the PTAB.

Judge Smith remarked that early in his career as an IP attorney he worked for Nokia and that his employment often took him to Nokia’s headquarters in Finland.  He claimed to have met Mr. and Mrs. Claus and to have spent many hours with the Clauses at their summer home and reindeer reserve in Lapland.

Santa apparently gave Judge Smith advice that he has followed in overseeing the PTAB, the new appellate body established by the America Invents Act to hear challenges to issued patents as well as patent application appeals.
Continue Reading PTAB Chief Judge Smith Shares Santa’s Secrets with Boston Patent Attorneys

The addition of discovery to review proceedings before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), such as inter partes review, and post-grant review, have opened up the doors to new kind of challenges before the PTO.  However, attempting to receive additional discovery beyond that required by the rules in proceedings before the PTAB is not as easy as in District Court litigation.  In post-grant and inter partes proceedings, 37 C.F.R. §42.51(b)(2) provides the rules for additional discovery: parties are given the option to agree to additional discovery between themselves, and if they are unable to do so, the moving party must present a reasoning to the PTAB as to why the additional discovery is necessary “in the interests of justice.”  In post-grant reviews, the moving party is restricted even more because it must show that the additional evidence is directly related to factual assertions advanced by either party in the proceeding (See 37 C.F.R. §42.224).
Continue Reading No Fishing Allowed – Limits on Discovery Before the PTAB

Once a petition for inter partes review is filed, the patent owner has 3 months under the PTO rules (Rule 42-107) to file an optional preliminary response –  before the PTAB decides whether or not to institute proceedings.  Considering that the petitioner has typically spent many months preparing the petition, including preparing detailed claim charts and expert declarant testimony, the patent owner is usually at a disadvantage in mounting a rapid rebuttal.
Continue Reading To Respond or Not To Respond? – The Patent Owner’s Dilemma of a Preliminary Response